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ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred when it held that a subordination agreement, 
which surrendered the statutory right of priority, was valid 
notwithstanding the blanket prohibition in section 38-1-29. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-29 is unambiguous and prohibits a lien claimant 
from varying rights provided under the statute by private agreement. The Lender 
relies on dicta from a decision issued prior to the enactment of section 38-1-29 as 
the sole support under Utah law for its position. See Richards v. Security Pac. 
Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah 1993). Moreover, the Lender's position 
necessarily elevates the rights of lenders over those of lien claimants, ignores key 
language in the Richards opinion which is contrary to its argument, and ignores the 
legislature's subsequent enactment of section 38-1-39. 
In the opening brief, Olsen discussed the evolution of mechanics' liens and 
how other states, including California, have addressed lien waiver provisions in the 
statute. Olsen acknowledged the competing interests of lien claimants and lenders 
and discussed how courts have attempted to address these competing positions. 
Ultimately, given the lien statute's primary purpose of protecting lien claimants 
and the legislature's enactment of section 38-1-39, Olsen argued that section 38-1-
29, as it was previously situated, operated to void the Guaranty of Completion, and 
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the trial court erred when it concluded that industry practices dictated that section 
38-1-29 could not be construed to void the Guaranty. 
The underlying theme of the Lender's brief and the trial court's ruling is 
that subordination agreements cannot possibly violate section 38-1-29 because 
such a situation would be unworkable and not afford lenders any protections. First, 
the law governing the mechanics' lien statute and lien claimants is straightforward 
and well-established in Utah: a[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanic's Lien 
Act manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and 
furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement. Lien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that 
purpose." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f 8, 162 P.3d 1099 (quoting Interiors 
Contracting v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added)). The 
trial court's ruling failed to adhere to this policy when it upheld the Guaranty and 
narrowly, rather than broadly as required, construed section 38-1-29 to allow the 
use of subordination agreements. 
Next, in discussing the use of subordination agreements, this Court in 
Richards, the case on which the Lender so heavily relies, stated: "Given the 
legislature's creation of a specific statutory preference for mechanic's lienholders, 
if the question is framed as a choice between which party should receive a 
windfall, we believe it should be the mechanic's lienholder." See Richards, 849 
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P.2d at 612. When a party, like the Lender in this case, receives the value of a lien 
claimant's work without having paid for it, this Court's clear preference is to side 
with the lien claimant who is attempting to recover the value of the work and 
materials provided. See id. Although the Richards opinion does discuss the 
possible use of subordination agreements, it was issued prior to the enactment of 
section 38-1-29, and its discussion was limited in context. At the end of the day, 
Richards expresses that the rights of lien claimants under the statute are to be 
protected over those of a lender. As such, Richards does not support the Lender 
over Olsen, nor does it support the trial court's ruling in this case. 
Finally, the legislature endeavored to provide lenders with certain 
protections and later provided an exception to section 38-1-29's blanket 
prohibition when it enacted section 38-1-39. Nowhere in the Lender's brief is 
section 38-1-39 discussed. The reason for the Lender's failure to discuss section 
38-1-39 is simple: If the Lender's argument was correct, section 38-1-39 would be 
unnecessary. Like California after the Bentz decision, the Utah Legislature 
recognized a need to provide a statutory exception to blanket prohibition against 
waiving or abrogating lien rights as set forth in section 38-1-29. In creating this 
statutory exception, the legislature did not repeal section 38-1-29. Rather, the 
legislature crafted a narrow exception that was tied to a guaranty of payment, not 
completion, to the lien claimant and to statutorily required language informing the 
3 
lien claimant of the rights being compromised through the agreement. As 
discussed in the opening brief, the Guaranty of Completion wholly fails to meet the 
requirements set forth in section 38-1-39. The Guaranty of Completion was not 
accompanied by payment, and the Guaranty was deceptively titled with pages of 
boilerplate language requiring a lien claimant to waive all rights provided under 
the statute. 
The trial court erred when it held that section 38-1-29 allows for 
subordination agreements. Section 38-1-29 prohibits a lien claiming from varying 
rights under the statute through a private agreement. A subordination is 
quintessential variation of the one of the most important statutory rights granted to 
lien claimants—the right of priority. In 2006, the right of priority could not be 
"varied by agreement," and more importantly, it could not be varied through a 
three page document with a deceptive title as compared to the document's actual 
effect. 
II. The trial court erred when it summarily concluded that the only 
evidence in the record was not sufficient on this issue of fraudulent 
inducement. 
The only evidence in the record demonstrates the Lender's agent 
misrepresented the terms and effect of the Guaranty of Completion in order to 
induce Luke Watkins into signing the agreement. Once evidence is introduced to 
indicate the Lender voluntarily undertook a duty to inform Maestro of the contents 
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and effect of the Guaranty of Completion, the rule that one party does not have an 
obligation to assure that the other has a clear and accurate understanding of the 
document is rendered moot. Utah law recognizes that once a party voluntarily 
assumes a duty, which it may have had no obligation to assume, it must discharge 
that duty fairly and competently. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mountain Logan Clinic, 
LLC, 2008 UT 21, f 15, 182 P.3d 333; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, f26, 61 
P.3d 1068. 
The trial court erred when it ignored the only evidence in the record in 
order to grant summary judgment to the Lender. The trial court failed to address 
the long recognized the rule of law which provides "'that a person will be given 
relief from fraud even though he failed to read the contract before signing if he was 
by some act or artifice induced to refrain from reading it, or if because of the 
circumstances he was justified in relying on the representations made.'" Berkeley 
Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) {quoting Johnson 
v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (1945)); see also The Cantamar, LLC 
v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ffi|20-24, 142 P.3d 140. Because this issue is 
generally resolved by a jury, the trial court erred when it granted summary 
judgment and dismissed Olsen's lien claim. 
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III. In addition to being fraudulently induced, the assignment clause in the 
Guaranty fails by its express terms and for lack of consideration. 
As set forth above, Maestro's signature on the Guaranty was fraudulently 
obtained rendering its provisions invalid, but assuming the Guaranty was 
enforceable, the assignment does not apply to this lien claim and would be 
unenforceable due to a failure of consideration. The Lender's attempt to rely on 
certain provisions within the Guaranty fails because the bank has not correctly 
interpreted the terms of the selected provision, nor has it properly applied the 
provisions to the claims in this action. 
a. The express terms of the assignment render it inapplicable as a defense 
to this lien claim. 
The Lender erroneously contends the Guaranty assigned all of Maestro's 
claims to the Lender. The alleged assignment provision follows the subordination 
clause, and it states: "Guarantor does hereby assign to Lender all claims which it 
may have or acquire against Borrower or against any assignee or trustee in 
bankruptcy of Borrower; provided however, that such assignment shall be effective 
only for purpose of assuring to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loan." 
The express terms of the assignment provision renders the Lender's interpretation 
and application of the assignment incorrect for two reasons. First, the assignment 
only pertains to an assignment of a claim against the Borrower rather than the 
collateral. Second, the assignment is only for purposes of bankruptcy or 
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insolvency of the Borrower and then it is "effective only for purposes of assuring 
to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loan." 
i. The assignment only applies to Maestro's claims against the 
Borrower. 
The Guaranty defines the terms used in the document, and the assignment 
does not include claims against the property. In the definitions portion of the 
Guaranty, Borrower is defined as "Matt Hood." In addition, Collateral is 
separately defined, and the definition of Collateral does not include the Borrower. 
(R. at 283.) All portions of the subordination clause of the Guaranty, which 
includes the purported assignment, require Maestro to subordinate and assign any 
claims it has against the Borrower, Matt Hood. The subordination clause contains 
no requirement that Maestro subordinate or assign its claims against the Collateral 
or the property. The Lender attempts to interpret this assignment broadly to cover 
any possible claim. The subordination and assignment, which the Lender drafted, 
are narrowly tailored and do apply to Olsen's mechanics' lien against the property 
because the property is not included in the definition of the "Borrower." 
In this action, Olsen seeks to foreclose against the property through a 
mechanics' lien. The Borrower, as defined in the Guaranty, is not a party to the 
action. An action to foreclose against the property is an in rem proceeding. See, 
e.g., Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99, ffi[9-l 1, 22 P.3d 784 (judgment lien 
against property survives in personam bankruptcy action); Blue Creek Land & Live 
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Stock Co., v. Kehrer et aL, 60 Utah 62, 206 P. 287, 289 (1922) (foreclosure action 
is an action in rem). Accordingly, since the assignment provision contained in the 
subordination clause only applies to a claim against the Borrower, it has no 
application to an in rem claim asserted against the property. The assignment in the 
Guaranty of Completion is not a defense available to the Lender in this action. 
ii. The assignment only applies in a bankruptcy proceeding 
and only then to ensure the Lender is paid what it is owed 
under its loan to the Borrower. 
The assignment is not as broad as the Lender would lead this Court to 
believe. In quoting the assignment language, the Lender omits the preceding 
sentence which provides the context for the assignment. The preceding sentence 
provides: "In the event of insolvency and consequent liquidation of the assets of 
Borrower, through bankruptcy, by an assignment for the benefit of creditors, by 
voluntary liquidation, or otherwise, the assets of Borrower applicable to the 
payment of claims of both Lender and Guarantor shall be paid to Lender and shall 
be first applied by Lender to the Loan." The quoted language relied on by the 
Lender follows this provision. The assignment requires Maestro to assign any 
claims against the Borrower, assignee, or trustee "in Bankruptcy of Borrower." 
Accordingly, the assignment only applies in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding and requires Maestro to assign its claims to the Lender in order to 
ensure the Lender is paid first in the bankruptcy action - i.e. a subordination clause 
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directly tied to bankruptcy. Accordingly, the assignment has no effect on the claim 
in this case which are not against the Borrower and not asserted in the Borrower's 
bankruptcy. 
In addition, the Lender overlooks the provision in the assignment which 
states: "provided however, that such assignment shall be effective only for 
purpose of assuring to Lender full payment in legal tender of the Loan." The 
Lender makes no argument for how this provision could be read to allow the 
assignment to be asserted as a defense to a foreclosure action against the property. 
The assignment is limited to bankruptcy proceedings, and by its terms, is limited to 
assure the Lender has priority to full payment in the bankruptcy action. The 
assignment has no application to Olsen's claims in this matter. 
b. Assuming the assignment was enforceable and covered the in rem claim 
in this action, the Guaranty would be unenforceable due to failure of the 
consideration. 
In asserting the Guaranty provisions as a defense to the lien claim in this 
action, the Lender has not described what consideration was provided in exchange 
for the Guaranty. If Maestro was paid in full, the consideration would be the 
payments secured by Maestro's consent to the Guaranty. Where Maestro's claim 
is for money owed for its work, this action demonstrates that the consideration 
failed. As such, the Guaranty provisions are not enforceable for failure of 
consideration. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah law does not support the trial court's ruling that (1) a subordination 
agreement is allowed under the 2006 version of the mechanic's lien statute, or (2) a 
Lender's agent is entitled to misrepresent the terms and effect of a document with 
impunity. Olsen respectfully requests this court to reverse the trial court and 
remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this ' day of June, 2010. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON 
P^UI^P. BURGHARDT 
Tfftorneysfor Appellant 
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